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Abstract
Neural networks are commonly used in safety-critical real-world applications.
Unfortunately, the predicted output is often highly sensitive to small, and possibly
imperceptible, changes to the input data. Proving that either no such adversarial
examples exist, or providing a concrete instance, is therefore crucial to ensure
safe applications. As enumerating and testing all potential adversarial examples is
computationally infeasible, verification techniques have been developed to provide
mathematically sound proofs of their absence using overestimations of the network
activations. We propose an improved technique for computing tight upper and lower
bounds of these node values, based on increased flexibility gained by computing
both bounds independently of each other. Furthermore, we gain an additional
improvement by re-implementing part of the original state-of-the-art software
“Neurify”, leading to a faster analysis. Combined, these adaptations reduce the
necessary runtime by up to 78%, and allow a successful search for networks and
inputs that were previously too complex. Finally, we provide proofs for tight upper
and lower bounds on max-pooling layers in convolutional networks. To ensure
widespread usability, we open source our implementation “Debona”, featuring
both the implementation specific enhancements as well as the refined boundary
computation for faster and more exact results.
1 Introduction
Major advances in both the theory and implementation of neural networks have enabled their
employment in many application domains including safety-critical ones, such as autonomous driving
[Bojarski et al., 2016], healthcare [Esteva et al., 2019], or military [Wu et al., 2015]. However,
experience shows that neural networks often lack robustness properties, meaning that small, or even
imperceptible, perturbations of a correctly classified input can make it misclassified [Szegedy et al.,
2013]. Such adversarial examples have raised serious concerns as classification failures can entail
severe consequences especially in safety-critical applications.
To overcome this problem, two approaches can be taken that complement each other. The first one
is to guide the training process of neural networks so as to improve their robustness. This can be
accomplished, e.g., by incorporating relaxation methods [Dvijotham et al., 2018a, Wong et al., 2018].
The second approach is to verify the safety of the trained network by providing evidence for the
absence of adversarial examples. For this purpose, heuristic search techniques have been developed
that are based on gradient descent [Carlini and Wagner, 2017, Szegedy et al., 2013], evolutionary
algorithms [Nguyen et al., 2015], or saliency maps [Papernot et al., 2016]. However, such methods
usually do not provide reliable correctness assertions as they can only show the presence of adversarial
examples but never their absence.
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For safety-critical applications, however, it is required that robustness properties of neural networks
are rigorously established. Therefore, techniques based on formal verification have been developed
to prove the absence of adversarial examples within a certain distance of a given input. Ideally,
an automated algorithm should either guarantee that this property is satisfied by the network or
find concrete counterexamples demonstrating its violation. The effectiveness and efficiency of
such automated approaches crucially depends on how precisely they can estimate the decision
boundary of the network. This is known to be a hard problem for networks with piecewise linear
activation functions, such as ReLUs [Montufar et al., 2014]. While the activation function of
each node can be decomposed into its linear segments, the number of their possible combinations
increases exponentially with the number of nodes. Therefore, performing the analysis by exhaustively
enumerating these combinations is intractable.
The key idea to combat this state-space explosion problem is to apply over-approximation by means
of symbolic techniques. Symbolic representations allow to keep track of dependencies across network
layers when the actual dependencies become too complex to be represented explicitly. One of the
most promising approaches of this kind is introduced in [Wang et al., 2018a] and implemented in the
Neurify tool1, combining symbolic interval analysis, linear relaxation, and constraint refinement to
iteratively minimize the errors introduced during the relaxation process. As we will see later, however,
this approach makes the assumption that the interval bounds established by symbolic relaxation differ
by a constant amount. In many cases, this entails inaccuracies that could be avoided by obtaining
tighter bounds through an independent and, thus, more flexible handling of these bounds.
The contribution of the present paper is to introduce such an enhancement. Its key idea is to exploit
the fact that when using ReLU activation functions, the value of a node is at least zero. This can help
to improve lower bounds with an otherwise weak estimate, and subsequently also allows to tighten
upper bounds. Furthermore, we re-implemented part of Neurify, leading to a faster analysis. By
exploiting both the implementation-specific improvements and the computation of tighter bounds, our
software “Debona” reduces the runtime of analyses by up to 78%, and increases the rate of successful
analyses significantly. Finally, we provide proofs for tight upper and lower bounds on max-pooling
layers in convolutional networks. We open source Debona, to make it publicly available.2
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. After giving a brief overview of related work and
of preliminaries in Sections 2 and 3, we detail the analysis techniques implemented by Neurify and
our own improvements in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. The setup for assessing the latter and the
outcomes of the evaluation are described in Section 6, followed by a short conclusion in Section 7.
2 Related work
In this section, we focus on symbolic techniques for formal safety analyses of given neural networks,
ignoring approaches such as heuristic search algorithms or robustness-oriented training. Verifica-
tion methods include constraint solving based on Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) reasoning
[Dvijotham et al., 2018b, Ehlers, 2017, Katz et al., 2017, Lomuscio and Maganti, 2017, Narodytska
et al., 2018, Pulina and Tacchella, 2010, Wong and Kolter, 2018] or Mixed Integer Linear Program-
ming (MILP) solvers [Dutta et al., 2018, Fischetti and Jo, 2017, Tjeng et al., 2019], layer-by-layer
exhaustive search [Huang et al., 2017, Weng et al., 2018], and global optimization [Ruan et al.,
2018]. Unfortunately, the efficiency of these techniques is usually impaired by the high degree of
nonlinearity of the resulting formulae.
To overcome this problem, several linear or convex relaxation methods have been developed to strictly
approximate the decision boundary of a network, notably those based on abstract interpretation [Li
et al., 2019, Gehr et al., 2018, Singh et al., 2018, 2019]. While they tend to scale better than solver-
based approaches, this often comes at the price of reduced precision, entailing high false positive rates
and problems with identifying real counterexamples that substantiate violations of safety properties.
Our approach directly builds on the work described in [Wang et al., 2018a], which proposes a
combined approach that essentially employs symbolic relaxation techniques to identify crucial nodes
and that iteratively refines output approximations over these nodes with the help of a linear solver.
1https://github.com/tcwangshiqi-columbia/Neurify
2https://github.com/ChristopherBrix/Debona
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3 Notation
For a given neural network, let the size of the input layer be denoted by s0, followed by n subsequent
fully connected feed-forward layers of size s1, . . . , sn. The node values xˆ
(0)
1 , . . . , xˆ
(0)
s0 of the input
nodes represent the network input. Node inputs in subsequent layers are computed as the weighted
sum x(l)i =
∑sl−1
j=1 wi,j · xˆ(l−1)j . For all intermediate layers, the node output xˆ(l)i is computed by
applying a non-linear activation function g: xˆ(l)i = g(x
(l)
i ). Even though different activation functions
exist, this work assumes only ReLU operations are used, i.e., xˆ(l)i = max{0, x(l)i }, as they are easy
to compute, piecewise-linear, and commonly used. The propagation is stopped once the network
output x(n)i is computed. For notational simplicity, x
(l)
i and xˆ
(l)
i are referred to as x and xˆ whenever
the specific i and l are not important.
Eq∗ is the higher order function returning the non-linear formula for a given node x. Each node
can be approximated by linear upper and lower bounds. These will be referred to as Equp(x) and
Eqlow(x), respectively. Determining the bounds as a function, as opposed to a simple interval,
reduces the overestimation error (see Section 4). For the range of valid inputs, specified by the
concrete example and its maximal perturbation, both bounds have minimal and maximal values
Eqlow(x), Equp(x) and Eqlow(x), Equp(x), respectively. Wherever a distinction of upper and lower
bound is not necessary for the given argument, as it holds for both instances, they are referred to as
Eq(x). All listed equations can be determined for xˆ as well.
4 Neurify
For input nodes, upper and lower bounds are determined as a direct result of the given input and
the defined L∞ value for possible manipulations. Other commonly used bounds like L1 and L2
[Goodfellow et al., 2015] are supported as well, but not discussed in this paper. Based on the input
bounds, Neurify [Wang et al., 2018a] uses symbolic propagation to determine the bounds for each
following node. As opposed to naive interval propagation, symbolic propagation allows to detect
common factors of equations, and therefore to tighten the computed bounds:
a ∈ [0, 1]⇒ a− 0.5a interval∈ [0, 1]− 0.5 · [0, 1] = [0, 1]− [0, 0.5] = [−0.5, 1] (1)
a ∈ [0, 1]⇒ a− 0.5a symbolic= 0.5a ∈ [0, 0.5] (2)
Due to the ReLU operations used as the non-linear activation function, the computed symbolic bounds
may have to be relaxed to correctly bound the output of each node. Wang et al. [2018a] identify three
regions the node’s bound Eq(x) may fall into:
1. 0 ≤ Eq(x) ≤ Eq(x): If the lowest value taken by the bound is already non-negative, the
ReLU operation has no effect on it, and therefore Eq(xˆ) = Eq(x).
2. Eq(x) ≤ Eq(x) ≤ 0: If the largest value the bound may take is non-positive, the ReLU
operation guarantees that Eq(xˆ) = 0.
3. Eq(x) ≤ 0 ≤ Eq(x): If the boundary indicates that the node may become both negative and
positive, there is a non-linear dependence between the node’s input and output. Thus, the
output bounds need to be relaxed. Wang et al. [2018a] refer to these nodes as overestimated.
For overestimated nodes, they propose to use symbolic linear relaxation to find new bounds for the
ReLU output that are valid, but still tight. They prove that the relaxations
Equp(xˆ) = Relax(max{0, Equp(x)}) = Equp(x)
Equp(x)− Equp(x)
(Equp(x)− Equp(x)) (3)
Eqlow(xˆ) = Relax(max{0, Eqlow(x)}) = Eqlow(x)
Eqlow(x)− Eqlow(x)
Eqlow(x) (4)
minimize the maximal distance between max{0, Eq(x)} and Eq(xˆ). This relaxation is visualized in
Figures 1 and 2. However, as shown in Section 5.1, it is not optimal for approximating Eq∗(xˆ).
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Figure 1: Relaxation of the upper bound is
mandatory
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Figure 2: Relaxation of the lower bound is op-
tional and a trade off
Neurify makes the additional assumption that both bounds are separated only by some scalar δ, i.e.:
Equp(x) = g(x) + δ
x
up (5)
Eqlow(x) = g(x) + δ
x
low (6)
As this implies that the upper and lower bounds cannot be adapted individually, Wang et al. [2018a]
simplify Equations 3 and 4 by overestimating Equp(x) ≥ Eqlow(x) and Eqlow(x) ≤ Equp(x). This
ensures that both bounds are scaled by the same amount, yielding
Equp(xˆ) = g(xˆ) + δ
xˆ
up =
Equp(x)
Equp(x)− Eqlow(x)
(g(x) + δxup − Eqlow(x)) (7)
Eqlow(xˆ) = g(xˆ) + δ
xˆ
low =
Equp(x)
Equp(x)− Eqlow(x)
(g(x) + δxlow) (8)
However, it introduces an overestimation, implying that the resulting bounds are no longer maximally
tight. As described in Section 5, it is theoretically possible to determine better estimations ofEqup(x),
and decoupling the bounds allows to improve the lower bound significantly.
At each node, the upper (lower) bound is determined as the weighted sum of the upper (lower) bound
of all previous nodes with a positive weight plus the weighted sum of the lower (upper) bound of all
previous nodes with a negative weight.
Equp(x
(l+1)
j ) =
∑
i∈[1,...,sl],wj,i>0
wj,i · Equp(xˆ(l)i ) +
∑
i∈[1,...,sl],wj,i<0
wj,i · Eqlow(xˆ(l)i ) (9)
However, a naive application of this approach leads to weakened bounds. For li(x) ≤ fi(x) ≤ ui(x)
∀i ∈ [1, 3], f2(x) = − 12f1(x), and f3(x) = f1(x) + f2(x), the bounds of f3 could be computed as
u3(x) = u1(x) + u2(x) = u1(x)− 1
2
l1(x) (10)
l3(x) = l1(x) + l2(x) = l1(x)− 1
2
u1(x) (11)
even though f3(x) = f1(x) + f2(x) = f1(x)− 12f1(x) = 12f1(x) and therefore
u3(x) =
1
2
u1(x) ≤ u1(x)− 1
2
l1(x) (12)
l3(x) =
1
2
l1(x) ≥ l1(x)− 1
2
u1(x) (13)
Thus, it is important to track different paths that lead to the same node to first simplify the underlying
equation as much as possible, before determining the new upper and lower bounds. Even though this
is not described in [Wang et al., 2018a], it is implemented in Neurify.
After bounds for all nodes have been computed, Neurify uses an LP solver to find a potential
adversarial example. If evaluating the concrete input invalidates it, Neurify splits an overestimated
node and performs separate analyses for the assumption that it is either positive, or zero. Therefore,
in both these sub-analyses, no overestimation of the given node is necessary, and the bounds are
tightened. Wang et al. [2018a] split those nodes first that have the highest output gradient, an approach
proposed by Wang et al. [2018b].
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Figure 3: Zero bounding
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Figure 4: Maximizing the minimal lower bound
5 Improvements
The proposed improvements over Neurify are two-fold: First, we provide Debona 1.0 as a re-
implementation of parts of Neurify that eliminates some bugs from the original version. We note that
those bugs prevent Neurify from providing a mathematically sound proof for the (non-)existence of
some adversarial examples. For the inputs analyzed in this work, Neurify wrongly returns “no adv.
ex.” for two out of the 6,000 performed analyses, even though an adversarial example provably exists.
Moreover, Debona 1.0 avoids some performance bottlenecks, leading to a significantly faster analysis.
Notably, Debona makes full use of all available threads by performing a parallel search over possible
splits, whereas Neurify may occasionally not use the full power of parallelization. Debona also aborts
the LP solver after 30 seconds, to avoid long delays due to unfavorable network constraints. In those
situations, the analysis proceeds with the next split. Those optimizations allow the successful analysis
of inputs and networks that previously resulted in a timeout or abortion. The correctness of Debona
has been verified by comparing the analysis results with the equivalent but slower Neurify version.
Further speedups are realized by determining tighter bounds on the network nodes. By reducing
the overestimation, less splits have to be performed until an adversarial example can be found, or
their absence can be proven. As weak bounds in early layers negatively influence the bounds of later
layers, tight approximations are especially important for deep networks. The major improvement of
Debona 1.1 over Neurify is the ability to reduce the approximation error by defining the upper and
lower bounds independently of each other. As described in Section 4, Neurify computes one function
g(x) for each node x, and computes the upper and lower bounds as g(x) + δxup and g(x) + δ
x
low,
respectively. This implies that the lower bound cannot be changed (other than by moving it up or
down by a scalar δ) without influencing the upper bound as well. For decoupled bounds, we prove
the existence of a tighter lower bound, resulting in overall tighter approximations.
In addition to the improvements gained by decoupling the upper and lower bounds, we propose an
extension of the analysis that enables the efficient computation of tight bounds for max-pooling
layers, under the requirement that each such layer is preceded by a ReLU operation.
5.1 Zero bounding
Wang et al. [2018a] prove that Equation 4 minimizes the maximal distance between
max{0, Eqlow(x)} and Eqlow(xˆ). However, we argue that the lower bound Eqlow(xˆ) should be
chosen such that
Eqlow(xˆ) = argmin
Eqlow(xˆ)
{(max{0, Eqlow(x)} − Eqlow(xˆ)) + (max{0, Eqlow(x)} − Eqlow(xˆ))} (14)
= argmin
Eqlow(xˆ)
{0− Eqlow(xˆ) + Eqlow(x)− Eqlow(xˆ)} (15)
= argmin
Eqlow(xˆ)
{−Eqlow(xˆ)− Eqlow(xˆ)} (16)
where the last transformation is valid as Eqlow(x) is constant with respect to Eqlow(xˆ). We highlight
that this represents the sum of the maximum error on both the positive and the negative regime of the
bound, whereas Wang et al. [2018a] minimize the maximum of both errors. By minimizing the sum,
we allow the bound estimation to perform a trade off between optimizing both errors, reducing the
overall overestimation.
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Because the lower bound must be a linear equation, Eqlow(xˆ) = m · Eqlow(x) + n. Therefore
Eqlow(xˆ) = argmin
m·Eqlow(x)+n
{−m · Eqlow(x) + n−m · Eqlow(x) + n}
= argmax
m·Eqlow(x)+n
{m · Eqlow(x) + n+m · Eqlow(x) + n}
In the positive region of the bound, Eqlow(xˆ) must not provide stronger estimates than Eqlow(x),
i.e., Eqlow(xˆ)
∣∣
Eqlow(x)≥0 ≤ Eqlow(x)
∣∣
Eqlow(x)≥0, and both Eqlow(xˆ) and Eqlow(xˆ) are to be
maximized. Therefore, n = 0 and 0 ≤ m ≤ 1. It follows
Eqlow(xˆ) = argmax
m·Eqlow(x)
{m · Eqlow(x) +m · Eqlow(x)}
= argmax
m·Eqlow(x)
{m · (Eqlow(x) + Eqlow(x))}
=
{
Eqlow(x), if Eqlow(x) + Eqlow(x) ≥ 0
0, otherwise
Thus, Debona keeps the lower bound unchanged unless Eqlow(x) + Eqlow(x) < 0, in which case
it is replaced with a constant boundary of zero. We refer to this process as zero bounding. The
tightened lower bound positively impacts both the positive and negative bounds of subsequent layers.
A visualization of zero bounding is shown in Figure 3.
5.2 Over-approximation of upper bounds
As described in Section 4, the upper bound needs to be relaxed if it could be negative. To this end,
Equp(x) and Equp(x) have to be computed. For Equp(x), Eqlow(x) as used by Neurify is a valid
over-approximation. However, many possible lower bounds Eqlow(x) exist, and the one chosen to
determine Eqlow(x) may be different from bounds on x for other purposes. Specifically, it may be
beneficial to trade a weaker overall bound for an increased minimum. A visualization of this trade off
is shown in Figure 4. Empirically, however, we notice that the increased computational overhead does
not justify the improved boundary accuracy, and therefore, Debona does not use this optimization
technique.
5.3 Max-pooling
Convolutional networks commonly use max-pooling layers to reduce the layer size, which introduces
additional non-linearity. For a max-pooling operation max{x(l)j , . . . , x(l)j+k} we propose the following
upper and lower bounds:
max{Equp(x(l)j ), . . . , Equp(x(l)j+k)} (17)
= max{
∑
i∈[1,sl−1],
wj,i>0
wj,i · Equp(xˆ(l−1)i ) +
∑
i∈[1,sl−1],
wj,i<0
wj,i · E˜qlow(xˆ(l−1)i ), . . . , (18)
∑
i∈[1,sl−1],
wj+k,i>0
wj+k,i · Equp(xˆ(l−1)i ) +
∑
i∈[1,sl−1],
wj+k,i<0
wj+k,i · E˜qlow(xˆ(l−1)i )}
≤ max{
∑
i∈[1,sl−1],
wj,i>0
wj,i · Equp(xˆ(l−1)i ), . . . ,
∑
i∈[1,sl−1],
wj+k,i>0
wj+k,i · Equp(xˆ(l−1)i )} (19)
≤
∑
i∈[1,sl−1]
max{wj+r,i | r ∈ [0, k], wj+r,i > 0} · Equp(xˆ(l−1)i ) (20)
=
∑
i∈[1,sl−1]
max{wj,i, . . . , wj+k,i, 0} · Equp(xˆ(l−1)i ) (21)
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min{Eqlow(x(l)j ), . . . , Eqlow(x(l)j+k)} (22)
analogous
≥
∑
i∈[1,si]
min{wj,i, . . . , wj+k,i, 0} · Equp(xˆ(l−1)i ) (23)
where E˜qlow(xˆ
(l−1)
i ) = max{0, Eqlow(xˆ(l−1)i )} is a valid tightened lower bound if layer l − 1 uses
ReLUs as the activation function. We propose to implement and evaluate those bounds in future work.
5.4 Performance analysis
As described in Section 4, it is important to accumulate the effect of each predecessor node over all
possible network paths, to avoid weakening the upper and lower bounds. We note that Neurify is able
to do this as part of the forward propagation of bounds, yielding an analysis in O(n ·maxi∈[0,n] si)
steps. Due to the decoupled bounds, and therefore complicated equation storage, Debona cannot
efficiently do so. Thus, possible paths through the network need to be traced back from the current
node to the input layer, increasing the cost of analysis to O(n2 ·maxi∈[0,n] si). However, as shown
in Section 6, the actual overall runtime is still improved.
6 Experimental evaluation
We perform a series of experiments to show both the implementation specific improvements of
Debona 1.0 over Neurify and the additional improvements gained through the decoupling of upper
and lower bounds as described in Section 5 and implemented in Debona 1.1.
For all three software implementations, we evaluate images on six different networks: ff2x24, ff2x50,
ff2x512, ff3x24, ff3x50, and ff5x24 are feed-forward networks with the specified number and sizes of
hidden layers (i.e., a network structure of e.g. 784×24×24×10 for ff2x24). Networks ff2x24, ff2x50
and ff2x512 are the same as those used in [Wang et al., 2018a]. Networks ff3x24, ff3x50 and ff5x24
are trained on the MNIST corpus [LeCun et al., 2010] for six epochs, using Adam [Kingma and Ba,
2015] with a learning rate of 0.001. We note that we do not strive for strong network performance,
nor do we train the networks to make them more robust against adversarial attacks, as the aim of this
work is solely to demonstrate the effectiveness of the analyses.
All analyses are run on a machine with eight cores and 16 GB RAM. If the analysis has not terminated
after one hour (i.e., no adversarial example has been found, but the network has also not been proven
to be robust), it is aborted. For each experiment, we test for adversarial examples against 1,000 test
images from the MNIST dataset for a maximal input perturbation of L∞ = 10 and report the average
wall-clock time spent on a single image, as well as the number of splits performed. Both values
are averaged over the common subset of the 1,000 test images that could be successfully analyzed
by Neurify, Debona 1.0 and Debona 1.1. Images that lead to a timeout or error for one of these
implementations were excluded from the average, as the timeout of one hour was arbitrarily chosen,
and including them would distort the average. A complete list of all detailed results is given in the
appendix. All experiments are performed using double precision floating point operations. We note
that the results for Neurify are not completely consistent across repeated executions, as bugs in the
implementation may cause race-conditions. The reported values are selected from a random run, so
the average results are representative.
The results in Table 1 show significant gains both by the implementation specific improvements
in Debona 1.0, and the additionally tightened bounds in Debona 1.1. Across all networks, the
average runtime decreases by 16–51% when switching to Debona 1.0, demonstrating the importance
of highly efficient code. Even though our optimizations enable maximal parallelism and reduce
other bottlenecks, we propose to further optimize the implementation for additional gains. By open
sourcing Debona, we hope to stimulate such development.
Debona 1.1 provides an additional 22–72% reduction in runtime. This improvement is solely based
on our proposed technique, zero bounding, enabled by the decoupling of the computation of the
upper and lower bounds. With a combined decrease in runtime of 62–78%, Debona 1.1 allows to
test for adversarial examples up to four times as fast as the previous state-of-the-art software Neurify.
Furthermore, it enables the analysis of networks and inputs that were previously too complex. While
the decrease in unsuccessful analyses from Neurify to Debona 1.0 is based both on our removal
7
Table 1: Performance of analyses
Network Software Time [s] Sub-analyses Analysis result
adv. non-adv. undetermined
ff2x24 Neurify 4.7 141 770 222 8
Debona 1.0 2.3 (−51%) 126 (−11%) 773 227 0 (−100%)
Debona 1.1 1.8 (−62%) 98 (−30%) 773 227 0 (−100%)
ff2x50 Neurify 85.1 2,677 663 213 126
Debona 1.0 51.8 (−39%) 2,786 (+4%) 671 238 91 (−28%)
Debona 1.1 21.5 (−75%) 1,207 (−55%) 673 254 73 (−42%)
ff2x512 Neurify 4.1 65 252 11 737
Debona 1.0 3.1 (−24%) 66 (+2%) 253 16 731 (−1%)
Debona 1.1 0.9 (−78%) 3 (−95%) 224 57 719 (−2%)
ff3x24 Neurify 17.7 454 603 371 26
Debona 1.0 8.8 (−50%) 398 (−12%) 608 391 1 (−96%)
Debona 1.1 6.8 (−62%) 302 (−33%) 608 391 1 (−96%)
ff3x50 Neurify 133.7 3,681 561 215 224
Debona 1.0 91.9 (−31%) 3,574 (−3%) 561 255 184 (−18%)
Debona 1.1 29.1 (−78%) 1,229 (−67%) 558 289 153 (−32%)
ff5x24 Neurify 91.9 2,434 677 244 79
Debona 1.0 77.6 (−16%) 1,981 (−19%) 689 262 49 (−38%)
Debona 1.1 33.7 (−63%) 1,160 (−52%) 693 272 35 (−65%)
of bugs that cause the analysis to fail or miss critical regions of the search space, and the general
speedup, Debona 1.1 provides tighter upper and lower estimations for each node, thus significantly
reducing the complexity of the search. An overview of the bound tightness is given in the appendix.
We highlight that Debona 1.1 performs better for the detection of proofs for the non-existence
of adversarial examples than for finding specific non-safe instances. For networks ff2x512 and
ff3x50, the number of found adversarial examples decreases, while the number of provenly safe
inputs significantly increases. This indicates that while the tightened bounds reduce the search space
sufficiently to prove that many networks are robust to adversarial attacks, for some inputs adversarial
examples exist but are hidden in a large search space. As the improved boundaries influence the
search pattern, previously reachable instances may be moved back too far, causing a timeout. We
propose to further investigate this effect, to find search patterns that are robust to changes in the
network boundaries and to speed up the detection of adversarial examples.
7 Conclusion
In conclusion, we have shown that by decoupling the computation of the upper and lower bound,
significant improvements to the network boundary estimation can be realized. We have proven that
zero bounding allows for overall tighter approximations of the lower bound by jointly optimizing its
error in both the negative and positive regime. In our open source implementation, we gain a speedup
of up to 78% by applying this technique in combination with implementation-specific modifications,
compared with the state-of-the-art software Neurify. Furthermore, we provide the formula for tight
upper and lower bounds on max-pooling layers, proposing their implementation and evaluation as
future work.
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Broader impact
By providing mathematically sound proofs for the non-existence of adversarial examples, Debona
may help to justify the application of neural networks in safety-critical applications. While increased
trust and control is generally desirable, it is important to note that Debona only disproves the existence
of adversarial examples for a given input, not for any possible input, and that the network prediction
should still be handled with care. Given full access to a network and its weights, Debona may also be
used by attackers to actively search for adversarial examples and maliciously fool a network.
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Appendix
Performance of analyses averaged over all results
Table A.1: Performance of analyses averaged over all results
Network Software Time [s] Sub-analyses Analysis result
adv. non-adv. undetermined
ff2x24 Neurify 4.7 141 770 222 8
Debona 1.0 2.7 152 773 227 0
Debona 1.1 2.1 119 773 227 0
ff2x50 Neurify 84.4 2,656 663 213 126
Debona 1.0 123.5 6,581 671 238 91
Debona 1.1 96.0 5,204 673 254 73
ff2x512 Neurify 3.8 58 252 11 737
Debona 1.0 33.9 895 253 16 731
Debona 1.1 94.0 2,191 224 57 719
ff3x24 Neurify 17.7 454 603 371 26
Debona 1.0 10.0 448 608 391 1
Debona 1.1 7.6 335 608 391 1
ff3x50 Neurify 132.5 3,648 561 215 224
Debona 1.0 192.4 7,746 561 255 184
Debona 1.1 148.6 6,455 558 289 153
ff5x24 Neurify 95.3 2,543 677 244 79
Debona 1.0 131.6 3,425 689 262 49
Debona 1.1 96.5 3,271 693 272 35
Similar to Table 1, Table A.1 provides the average runtime of each software version over the different network
architectures. However, Table A.1 reports the average over all analyses that returned a result, not only the subset
that was analyzable by all implementations. The increase in runtime and number of sub-analyses for Debona 1.0
and 1.1 is to be expected, as they include analyses that result in a timeout for previous software versions.
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Tightness of initial output bounds
Table A.2: Tightness of initial output bounds
Network Software Average bound distance
ff2x24 Neurify 24.0
Debona 1.0 24.0
Debona 1.1 21.2
ff2x50 Neurify 45.1
Debona 1.0 45.1
Debona 1.1 37.7
ff2x512 Neurify 252.1
Debona 1.0 252.1
Debona 1.1 191.1
ff3x24 Neurify 13.7
Debona 1.0 13.7
Debona 1.1 12.1
ff3x50 Neurify 25.1
Debona 1.0 25.1
Debona 1.1 20.1
ff5x24 Neurify 27.1
Debona 1.0 27.1
Debona 1.1 24.2
Table A.2 lists the average distance between the upper and lower bounds of the output nodes, averaged over all
1,000 test images and all 10 output nodes. Neurify and Debona 1.0 have the exact same average distance, as
Debona 1.0 is only a re-implementation of Neurify, and none of the removed bugs influenced the bounds that are
computed before any splitting is performed.
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